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Abstract
Sovereign debt crises in emerging markets are usually associated with liquidity and
banking crises within the economy. This connection is suggested by both anecdot-
ical and empirical evidence. The conventional view is that the domestic financial
turmoil is caused by foreign creditors’ retaliation. Yet, there is no clear-cut evi-
dence supporting the existence of “classic” default penalties (e.g., trade sanctions
or exclusion from international capital markets). This paper then proposes a novel
mechanism linking sovereign defaults with liquidity and banking crises without any
intervention of foreign creditors. The model considers a standard unwillingness-to-
pay problem assuming that: (i) the enforcement of private contracts is limited and,
as a result, public debt represents a source of liquidity; (ii) the government can-
not discriminate between domestic and foreign agents. In this setting, the prospect
of drying up the private sector’s liquidity restores the ex-post incentive to pay of
the government without any need to assume foreign penalties. Nonetheless, liquidity
crises might arise when economic conditions deteriorate and the government chooses
opportunistically to default in order to avoid the repayment of foreign agents. The
interaction between the enforcement friction and sovereign risk is then exploited
to study the implications on international capital flows and legal and institutional
domestic reforms.
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1 Introduction
A long-standing question in the sovereign debt literature concerns the identification of
the costs associated with default. Given that sovereigns cannot be forced to honor their
obligations under existing legal arrangements (due to the jurisprudential principle of
“sovereign immunity”), the literature coincides on that the mechanism making sovereign
debt possible is that countries repay their debt to avoid the costs of default. There is
no doubt, indeed, that default represents an unappealing policy option for governments,
which might precipitate the economy into protracted growth slowdown and financial
turmoil. Nevertheless, there is much less agreement on which mechanism generates such
negative outcomes. Typically, past studies have focused on “external” cost channels as
trade sanctions, borrowing restrictions or reputational issues,1 but there is no clear-cut
evidence supporting the existence of these classic penalties.2 My analysis, instead, takes
an inward perspective and proposes a novel mechanism linking sovereign defaults with
liquidity and banking crises without any intervention of foreign creditors.
This paper is motivated by both anecdotical and empirical evidence suggesting that
sovereign debt crises in emerging markets are usually associated with liquidity crises
and banking crises within the economy. For example, during the Argentine crisis in
2001-2002, the temporary suspension of debt payments by the government concurred to
undermine the strength of banks’ balance sheets. With banks not granting new loans,
businesses dramatically cut back on their spending, aggravating further the economic
downturn.3 Such a “domino effect” might be a latent threat in many emerging markets,
where domestic financial institutions, in particular commercial banks, are major holders
of public debt.4 As a matter of fact, Borensztein and Panizza (2008) show that over the
period 1980-2000 sovereign defaults often predicted banking crises in a wide sample of
emerging economies.5
1See Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer (2006) for a state of the art review of the literature.
2Though, the academic debate on the identification of these “classic” penalties is alive and well.
Borensztein and Panizza (2008) review past empirical studies on the cost of defaults.
3A similar analysis is made by Mishkin (2006), as reported in the appendix.
4Kumhof and Tanner (2005) report that financial institutions’ net credit to the government relative
to their total assets ranges from 20% to 40% in emerging markets, whereas this ratio is typically around
10% in advanced countries.
5Applying a methodology similar to Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) to a large sample of countries
over 1975-2000, these authors find that the probability of a banking crisis in a given year conditional on
having a sovereign default in the same year or in the year before is 14 percent, whereas the unconditional
probability is only a 2 percent, and the difference between the conditional and unconditional probability
is statistically significant. On the other hand, the probability of a sovereign default conditional on a
banking crisis is not statistically different from the unconditional probability. This evidence then suggests
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In order to explain the connection between sovereign defaults and liquidity and banking
crises, this paper studies a standard unwillingness-to-pay problem in a setting where: (i)
domestic firms save (either directly or indirectly through the banking sector) in govern-
ment bonds, which are stored as a reserve of liquidity to finance a reinvestment made
necessary by an unexpected shock; (ii) the government cannot discriminate between
domestic and foreign bondholders. As a consequence of these two assumptions, the gov-
ernment faces a trade-off when choosing whether to fulfill its debt obligations. Indeed,
debt repayment implicitly transfers resources from domestic taxpayers to both domestic
bond holders (domestic firms) and foreign bond holders. The transfer to domestic bond
holders involves only a redistribution within the economy. When the government does
not care about wealth inequality, such a transfer unambiguously raises domestic welfare
since it enhances liquidity provision in the economy. On the other hand, the transfer to
foreign bond holders involves a redistribution of resources away from the economy. Given
that the government does not care about foreigners, such a transfer reduces domestic
welfare.
More specifically, the model considers a small open economy that has scarce initial re-
sources, limited legal enforcement and suffers from a lack of collateral which limits the
private provision of liquidity (i.e., easily tradable financial securities). Domestic firms
face the risk of adverse shocks, that require an additional investment along the produc-
tion process, and need to store precautionary savings. Given that there is under-supply
of private securities and no exogenous storage technology, domestic firms save in govern-
ment bonds. At the same time, the government issues a public bond to both domestic
and foreign agents in order to undertake a public investment project. In addition, the
government is a sovereign which cannot credibly commit to honor its future obligations
and cares only about domestic agents. The standard unwillingness-to-pay problem then
arises as the government has an ex-post incentive to avoid the repayment of foreign
creditors. Yet, assuming that the government cannot discriminate between domestic
and foreign bond holders, the repudiation of debt produces a loss of aggregate output as
domestic firms cannot reinvest in their projects. My model then shows that the prospect
of drying up the private sector’s liquidity restores the ex-post incentive to pay of the
government without any need to assume foreign penalties.
In this setting, a liquidity crisis arises when the economy experiences an adverse shock
(either an aggregate productivity shock or a terms-of-trade shock). However, the crisis
is not triggered by either currency or maturity mismatches in the government’s fiscal
that sovereign defaults might lead to banking crises, while the contrary is on average not true.
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balance, as supposed in past studies,6 but it is a consequence of the opportunistic be-
havior of the government. As the aggregate shock lowers the returns of domestic firms
on additional investment, the social cost implied by a liquidity crisis falls below the fiscal
cost required to repay the debt and so the government announces the default. In par-
ticular, the model suggests that the occurrence of liquidity crises induced by sovereign
default is particularly likely in economies characterized by pronounced business cycle
volatility.
By highlighting a direct mechanism through which a sovereign default imposes a cost
on the domestic economy, my paper contributes to the sovereign debt literature. Since
the seminal contribution of Eaton and Gersovitz (1981), the conventional view in the
literature has been that default represents an unappealing policy option for governments
since it either triggers foreign retaliation, and thus exerts a negative effect on domestic
production and financial activity, or has reputational consequences.7 Only recently, and
in part as a side effect of the financial turmoil caused by the latest default episodes, more
attention has been paid on direct effects on the domestic economy. Notable contributions
in this sense are Sandleris (2006) and Broner and Ventura (2006, 2008). In particular,
my paper is closely related to Broner and Ventura (2006, 2008) in assuming that the
government cannot discriminate between domestic and foreign agents. Different impli-
cations are however obtained. In the framework considered by these authors, sovereign
default leads to an undesirable redistribution of resources within the economy. In my
model, instead, sovereign default leads to a disruption of private investment.
My paper is also related to the work of Woodford (1990) and, in particular, Holmstrom
and Tirole (1998). These authors show that a credible and benevolent government can
enhance private liquidity provision by issuing a public bond. Indeed, the government
can expand the supply of liquidity (i.e., easily tradable financial securities) thanks to
its assumed ability to commit agents’ future income through taxation.8 Nevertheless,
Holmstrom and Tirole’s argument depends crucially on the assumption that the econ-
6In particular, in the Original Sin literature, as surveyed in Eichengreen et al. (2003), or in Chang
and Velasco (1999).
7See in addition, Grossman and Van Huyck (1988), Bulow and Rogoff (1989), Fernandez and Rosen-
thal (1990), Cole and Kehoe (1998), Kletzer and Wright (2000), Wright (2002), Amador (2004), Yue
(2005), Aguiar and Gopinath (2006) and Arellano (2008), among others. See Eaton and Ferna´ndez (1995)
and Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer (2006) for two excellent surveys of the sovereign debt literature.
8The issue of optimal liquidity provision has been extensively analyzed by past literature. A partial
list of past contributions include Reinhart et al. (2000),Allen and Gale (2004), Kumhof (2004), Taddei
(2004), Gorton and Huang (2004), Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2008). In particular, Caballero and
Krishnamurthy (2008) push this argument farther and show that the government intervention can also
improve efficiency in the use of private collateral.
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omy is closed, and so domestic firms cannot store liquidity by saving abroad. Indeed,
when there are no restrictions on international capital flows and the government com-
mits to repay in the future, the interest rate on government bond is set by the world
interest rate and entrepreneurs are indifferent between saving in the domestic public
debt or saving abroad. In other words, international capital markets provide the econ-
omy with sufficient supply of liquidity and reduce the need for government intervention.
Nevertheless, my model shows that Holmstrom and Tirole’s argument can be restored
in an open economy setting by simply relaxing the assumption of credible government
commitment considered by these authors. In particular, it is possible to show that the
absence of commitment generates a contingent repayment policy by the government and,
as a result, government debt becomes an imperfectly substitutable source of liquidity for
the economy.
Finally, by relaxing the perfect commitment assumption, it is also possible to study in
a non trivial way the incentive of the government to improve domestic regulation. In
particular, a better rule of law induces a substitution between precautionary savings in
non-contingent government bonds to contingent forms of insurance. Yet, as domestic
firms don’t need anymore to save in government bond, the sovereign risk problem reap-
pears restricting the government’s access to foreign lending. My model then describes
the economic conditions that lead the government to improve regulation. In particular,
it is shown that the government’s incentive to undertake a legal reform is positively re-
lated to the average return on private investment and negatively to the return on public
investment. The model then suggests a possible explanation for cross-country and cross-
time variation in legal institutions which differs from studies stressing political economy
issues, as for example Rajan and Zingales (2003) and references therein.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes a baseline model of
government debt as a source of liquidity. Section 3 introduces sovereign risk in this setup
and analyzes the mechanism leading to liquidity crises. Section 4 discusses the model
implications on institutional and political reforms. Section 5 presents a cross-country,
cross-industry evidence that is suggestive of the mechanism emphasized by the paper.
Finally, section 6 concludes.
4
2 A model of government debt as a source of liquidity
In this section I set up the environment of the economy. The model highlights: (i) the
problem of domestic entrepreneurs (firms), who start a long-term investment facing the
risk of a shock on total costs (expenditure shock) before completion; (ii) the problem of
a benevolent government, who chooses public debt issuance in order to finance a public
investment project. As a consequence of capital market imperfections, domestic firms
save in government bonds to hoard a reserve of liquidity against the future shock. This
setup will be enriched by introducing sovereign risk in section 3, in order to study the
connection between sovereign default and liquidity and banking crises.
2.1 Environment
Consider a small open economy lasting for three periods: t = 0, 1, 2. In this econ-
omy there are only two goods: a private good, that can be used for consumption and
investment, and a public good, that can be used only for cosumption. The economy
is inhabited by three types of agents: a continuum (with mass one) of entrepreneurs,
a continuum (with mass one) of workers and a government. Both entrepreneurs and
workers are competitive and risk neutral, consume only at date 2 and their preferences
are described by the utility function U = c + υ(g), where c denotes the consumption
of the private good, g denotes the consumption of the public good and the function
υ(·) satisfies the Inada conditions. In addition to the three domestic agents, there is
an international financial market (IFM) which can lend to or borrow from the country
with no restrictions. The IFM is competitive, risk-neutral, deep-pocketed, has access to
an investment/saving technology with rate of return r = 1 and can perfectly commit to
repay in the future.
Let’s first characterize the technology and the agents of this economy. The entrepreneurs
are born with no endowment but have access to a private production technology. The
private technology is represented by a continuum of investment projects j operated
within individual firms. Projects have decreasing returns to scale and are subject to
two independent shocks, which are observed at date 1: (i) an aggregate shock, which
affects all projects in the same measure, and (ii) an idiosyncratic shock, which affects
each project individually. In particular, investment k in each project costs k units of the
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private good at date 0 and delivers a final output fs,j(k) at date 2, where
fs,j(k) =
 θsAj k if k ≤ k¯θsAj k¯ if k > k¯ , (1)
θs denotes the aggregate shock which depends on the state of the economy s and Aj
denotes the idiosyncratic shocks which is specific to each project j.
The production technology then features stepwise decreasing returns to scale, i.e. the
marginal return on capital is positive (and constant) up to the upper bound k¯ and zero
afterwards. This assumption reflects either the existence of indivisibility in physical
capital, i.e. machinery, plants, buildings, or bounded organizational capacity that limits
the scope of each entrepreneur’s investment. Notice that the main results of the paper
would go through even if the production technology were described by a continuously
differentiable production function with decreasing returns to scale. Yet, assuming a
production function like (1) permits to pin-point the aspects of the economy that are
crucial for the results of the paper, as discussed with more detail later on.
The aggregate shock θs reflects all sorts of events that exert a common effect on all firms
in the economy, e.g. improvements in total factor productivity, fluctuations in the terms
of trade, fiscal and economic reforms or changes in the supply of human capital. For
the sake of clarity, I henceforth refer to the aggregate shock as a “productivity” shock
and I assume that there are only two states of the economy, called “good state” and
“bad state”. In particular, the aggregate productivity equals θ¯ > 1 in the good state
and θ < 1 in the bad state. Let pi(θ¯) ∈ [0, 1] be the probability of the good state and
let pi(θ) = 1 − pi(θ¯) be the probability of the bad state. Lastly, the aggregate shock is
normalized to one in expected terms, i.e.
∑
θs∈{θ¯,θ} pi(θs) θs = 1.
The idiosyncratic shock Aj reflects, instead, those events that exert a localized effect on
each firm or sector. As a particular feature of the idiosyncratic shock, I consider that this
shock requires an additional investment by the entrepreneur that receives it. Suitable
examples for the idiosyncratic shock include machinery substitution, industry-specific
technology upgrades, sales recalling due to product imperfections, sudden interruption
of supply contracts. The idiosyncratic shock is hereby termed “expenditure” shock.
Suppose that the shock takes only two realizations, i.e. one half of the firms is “lucky”
and does not get the shock while the remaining half is “unlucky” and gets the shock.
Ex-ante all firms are equally likely to be lucky or unlucky. The expenditure shock causes
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a decline in firm productivity, which can be offset by an additional investment i. In
particular, when the firm is lucky, Aj = A and final output is θsAk. On the other hand,
when the firm is unlucky, Aj = a and final output is θs
(
ak+ (A−a) i), with i ≤ k given
that the additional investment can at most restore the ex-ante productivity. Recall now
that the aggregate and the idiosyncratic shock are independent and that the aggregate
shock is normalized to one in expected terms. Then, setting A+a2 > 1, the expected
return on the initial investment k is positive. In addition, setting θ (A − a) > 1, the
return on the additional investment i is also positive. Figure 1 describes the timing of
private investment projects.
Figure 1: Timing of Investment Projects
















ak + (A− a) i
”
The workers have no initial endowment as entrepreneurs, they don’t have access to the
private investment technology but they can work at date 1 obtaining a wage w. The
labor income is then saved until date 2, when workers retire and consume their wealth.
The source of workers’ wage is not explicitly determined, as it does not represent a
crucial feature for the results of the model.9
The government maximizes the average utility of domestic agents and has access to a
public investment technology. In particular, by investing g units of the private good,
it can provide a public good from which domestic agents obtain utility υ(g) at date
2. Furthermore, the government can issue a non-contingent bond (either short-term or
long-term) to both domestic and foreign agents and can collect lump-sum taxes from
9Yet, it is possible to consider that workers supply their labor force to entrepreneurs and receive a
remuneration along the production process.
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domestic agents at any date.
In conclusion, the economy has no initial endowment and has positive returns on both
private and public investment. As a result, the economy needs to borrow from the IFM
in order to reap the benefits from investment. In particular, at date 0 entrepreneurs
borrow the resources necessary to start their investment projects by issuing a set of
claims (equities) which assign to each holder an ownership right on a unit share of future
production. In addition, the government finances the public project by issuing a public
bond at date 0, which is repaid by collecting taxes from domestic agents either at date
1 or at date 2 (depending on the maturity structure of the initial bond issuance).
2.2 Financial frictions
The economy’s access to foreign credit is, however, restricted by weak legal and political
domestic institutions. Suppose either that the scope of financial regulation is somewhat
bounded or that courts’ effectiveness in enforcing private contracts is limited by flaws
in judicial procedures or pervasive corruption of public officers. In all of these circum-
stances, the economy would suffer from a lack of private collateral which restricts agents’
ability to borrow from outside investors. The following assumption provides a formal
description of the legal frictions in this economy.
Assumption 1 Domestic entrepreneurs can pledge as collateral only a fraction γ of
projects’ output, while workers cannot pledge their future labor income.
Arguably, Assumption 1 resembles the legal environment of an emerging economy char-
acterized by poor regulation and/or weak enforcement of private financial contracts.
This assumption has crucial consequences in the environment so far described. In par-
ticular, entrepreneurs, despite being risk-neutral, have an incentive to insure against the
idiosyncratic shock in order to avoid a pitfall in the expected revenue from the project.
Indeed, when γ A+a2 > 1 and γ θ¯(A − a) < 1, the initial investment k is profitable for
both domestic entrepreneurs and the IFM but the additional investment i is profitable
only for the former. Therefore, unlucky entrepreneurs cannot borrow in the spot market
at date 1 and are forced to abandon the profitable reinvestment.
Clearly, entrepreneurs could efficiently insure against the idiosyncratic shock by under-
writing a contingent contract with the IFM, which promises a positive transfer when the
8
firm is unlucky in exchange for a positive payment when the firm is lucky. Yet, in this
economy there is no such private insurance.
Assumption 2 Domestic entrepreneurs cannot enter into state contingent contracts.
This assumption can be justified arguing that poor regulation and ineffective monitoring
favor firms’ moral hazard and, consequently, limit their ability to get insurance. However,
an in-depth discussion of the factors that affect insurance provision is beyond the scope of
the paper, and Assumption 2 is taken as a description of a missing market in the economy.
Absent contingent contracts and given that borrowing at date 1 is not possible, the only
alternative open to entrepreneurs to buffer future shocks is to accumulate reserves of
non-contingent securities, which can be deployed in case of need.
Notice, however, that a benevolent government which seeks to maximize domestic so-
cial welfare and is able to costlessly reallocate resources among domestic agents could
design a contingent redistribution scheme transferring resources from workers and lucky
entrepreneurs to unlucky entrepreneurs. By doing so, the government could substi-
tute the private provision of insurance fostering the additional investment in distressed
projects. Nonetheless, the following assumption restricts the government from making
such transfers.
Assumption 3 The government cannot make positive transfers between domestic agents.
In the following section, I characterize the equilibrium for this economy assuming that
agents are fully rational and there is no asymmetric information, i.e. both types of
shocks are perfectly observable by all agents. In addition, I first consider a benchmark
case where the government has a good reputation and is fully credible.
Assumption 4 The government can credibly commit to fulfill its debt obligations.
The analysis of this particular case, where there is no risk of default on government
bonds, serves a purely illustrative purpose. Indeed, section 3 will show that, in the
environment so far described, the occurrence of a liquidity crisis can be accounted for
by relaxing exclusively Assumption 4.
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2.3 Equilibrium with government commitment
At date 0 the representative entrepreneur borrows an amount k+b+f by issuing equities
to the IFM, where k is the initial investment in the project, b is the saving in government
bonds and f is the saving in foreign bonds. At date 1 the entrepreneur can either be
lucky or unlucky. In the former case, the project requires no additional spending and
the entrepreneur rolls over his bond holdings b and f until date 2. In the latter case, the
project receives the expenditure shock and the entrepreneur deploys his saving in order
to invest i additional units of the private good in the project. Finally, his final output
is yl(θs) if he has been lucky and yu(θs) if he has been unlucky, where
yl(θs) = θsAk + b+ f and yu(θs) = θs
(
ak + (A− a) i
)
+ b+ f − i (2)
provided the initial investment k does not exceed the upper bound k¯. In this case,
indeed, the marginal return on k would be equal to zero in each contingency. Yet,
we can dismiss this possibility as the entrepreneur invests at most k¯ to maximize the
net return from the project. Having obtained the final output from the project, the
entrepreneur pays foreign shareholders by distributing dividends, which must be lower
or equal than the firm’s collateral and are respectively rl(θs) (k+ b+ f) ≤ γ yl(θs) and
ru(θs) (k+b+f) ≤ γ yu(θs). Recall that the IFM is competitive and risk neutral. Then,








1. Lastly, notice that I implicitly assumed that the representative entrepreneur does not
pay taxes. This assumption implies no loss of generality, as discussed with more detail
when I describe the government’s problem. Indeed, in equilibrium the government does
not tax entrepreneurs in order to preserve the net reserves of liquidity of domestic firms
and maximize their reinvestment.
Absent any borrowing constraint, the entrepreneur would choose the initial investment k,
the saving in government bonds b and in foreign bonds f , and the additional investment










− k − b− f (3)
subject to the resource constraint at date 1, i ≤ b + f , the maximum reinvestment
constraint, i ≤ k, and the positivity constraints on bond holdings, i.e. b ≥ 0 and f ≥ 0.
However, as firm’s collateral is limited, the entrepreneur choice is also subject to the
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borrowing constraint,









where the firm collateral includes both the value of production and the final bond hold-
ings. The problem of the entrepreneur then consists in choosing {k, i, b, f} in order to
maximize (3) subject to (4) plus the intermediate period resource constraint i ≤ b+ f ,
the maximum reinvestment constraint i ≤ k and the constraints b ≥ 0, f ≥ 0.
As long as k ≤ k¯, the expected marginal return on initial investment k is positive, i.e.
A+a
2 > 1, and the entrepreneur has an incentive to raise initial investment up to k¯.
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Yet, the entrepreneur can borrow the resources necessary to start the project only when





] ≥ 1. This represents the first condition on the parameter γ.
Recall now that θ(A − a) > 1 and suppose that γθ¯(A − a) < 1. As discussed before,
these two conditions make the additional investment i profitable for the entrepreneur
but not for the IFM. Then, an unlucky entrepreneur cannot borrow resources in the spot
credit market at date 1 and can only reinvest by deploying his saving in the government
and foreign bonds. In particular, the entrepreneur will use all his reserves of bonds to
maximize the profitable reinvestment and i = b + f . As the case of interest is i < k, I
impose a further condition on the parameter γ to ensure that the maximum reinvestment
constraint is never binding and it can be omitted. The above restrictions are summarized
by the following technical assumption.
Technical assumption 1
The parameter γ and θ¯ satisfy the following conditions:
(i) γ > 1A+a
2




[1+(A−a)] , (iii) θ¯ <
1
γ¯(A−a) .
Maximization of program (3)-(4) implies the following optimal investment and saving
decisions,
k = k¯ and b+ f =
γA+a2 − 1
1− γ 12 [1 + (A− a)]
k¯. (5)
10Notice that the aggregate shock is omitted as the two shocks (aggregate and idiosyncratic) are
independent and the aggregate shock has been normalized to one.
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The first condition takes into account that the entrepreneur wants to maximize the ex-
pected return on initial investment. The second condition is obtained from the borrowing
constraint (4). It is easy to see that the government bond and the foreign bond are per-
fect substitutes and the firm is indifferent between saving at home or saving abroad.
Yet, this result depends crucially on the assumption that the government can credibly
commit to repay in the future, in which case the interest rate on government bonds is set
by the world interest rate. In the next section, instead, this assumption will be relaxed
and it will be shown that the firm will be no more indifferent between the two types of
bonds.
Notice also that the lack of collateral does not affect the initial investment of the firm,
which is set at its first-best level. On the contrary, it limits the amount of liquidity,
i.e. government and foreign bonds, that can be stored and used by firms to finance
the intermediate reinvestment.11 This result is driven by the stepwise marginal return
structure imposed on the production function and could be easily avoided by considering
a more general production technology. It is, however, well known that the presence of
capital market imperfections affects firms’ investment choices, reducing the stock of
capital available for production.12 For this reason, the model has been designed in a
way that the presence of borrowing constraints affects exclusively firms’ need for liquidity
and the size of precautionary reserves. Indeed, the results obtained in the central section
of the paper, section 3, arise exclusively from the interaction between firms’ need for
liquidity and the government’s inability to commit.
Consider now the problem of the benevolent government, which has to choose public in-
vestment, debt issuance and individual taxation in order to maximizes the average utility
11In particular, this result depends on the assumption that the marginal return on initial investment
is constant and positive for both entrepreneurs and outside investors, i.e. the IFM. Yet, the intermediate
reinvestment is profitable for entrepreneurs but it reduces the amount of collateral that outside investors
can seize from unlucky firms.
12Since the seminal contribution of Modigliani and Miller (1958), scholars have been aware that the
presence of financial frictions affects the capital structure of private companies and distorts their in-
vestment choices. Hubbard (1998) and Stein (2003) provide two excellent reviews of the economic
literature studying the effects of capital market imperfections on corporate investment. Past research
has also shown that a number of macroeconomic consequences can arise from the presence of borrowing
constraints at the corporate level. A necessarily incomplete list of past contributions include: studies
that show that financial frictions generate credit cycles and amplify aggregate volatility, e.g. Bernanke
and Gertler (1989), Bernanke et al. (1999), Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997),
Kocherlakota (2000), Martin (2005); studies that show that financial frictions generate divergence in
cross-country wealth distribution, in cross-country or current account balances, respectively Matsuyama
(2004) and Caballero et al. (2008); studies that show that financial instability and sudden stops in cap-
ital inflows in emerging markets are exacerbated by collateral constraints, e.g. Aghion et al. (2004),
Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2001), Chinn and Kletzer (2000), Mendoza (2006).
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of domestic agents. The economy has no initial endowment and, therefore, the govern-
ment must finance the public investment g by issuing debt. As domestic entrepreneurs
are treated as first comers by the government and workers cannot buy public bonds,13
at the end of date 0 the level of domestic debt is b and the level of external debt is equal
to b∗ = g − b.
Before solving the government’s problem, it is convenient to examine the maturity struc-
ture of public debt. As domestic entrepreneurs and the IFM are indifferent between
buying short-term or long-term debt,14 the government can arbitrarily choose to issue
one-period bonds or two-periods bonds. Furthermore, provided the government taxes
only workers at date 1 (while it can indifferently tax entrepreneurs’ profits and workers’
savings at date 2), the lump-sum taxation is non-distortionary.15 Therefore, Ricardian
Equivalence holds and the government is indifferent between issuing short or long term
debt (as explained in the next section, this result depends crucially on the government’s
ability to commit). Without loss of generality, I then consider that the government is-
sues only short-term debt and repays it by collecting taxes on domestic workers at date
1.
The objective function of the government, or social welfare function, is then given
by
W = Π + w + υ(g)− τ (6)
where Π is the expected revenue of entrepreneurs, w is the labor income of workers,
υ(g) is the average utility of domestic agents from the public investment g and τ is the
taxation on workers at date 1. The government’s budget constraint is defined by,
g = b+ b∗ and τ = b+ b∗. (7)
Social welfare maximization then implies the following optimality condition for public
investment,
υ′(g) = 1.
13Indeed, domestic workers have no wealth at date 0 and cannot borrow as they have no collateral.
14At date 1 domestic entrepreneurs could indeed pledge as collateral their holdings of long-term bonds
in order to get the same amount of liquidity that they could have obtained from the government as a
repayment of the short-term debt. In addition, the IFM is indifferent between short-term and long-term
debt by construction.
15On the other hand, taxation on entrepreneurs at date 1 lowers the reserves of liquidity and the
profitable investment of unlucky firms and therefore generates a social dead-weight loss.
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Finally, when the first-best public investment is lower or equal than the total saving of
domestic entrepreneurs, i.e. g ≤ b + f , there exists at least one equilibrium in which
the government can finance the public good by issuing only domestic debt. In the
alternative case, i.e. g > b + f , public bonds issuance exceeds the total saving of
domestic entrepreneurs and the government needs to borrow from abroad. In the rest
of the paper, this second situation would represent the case of interest.
2.4 Discussion
Holmstrom and Tirole (1998), and Woodford (1990), argued that government debt en-
hances private liquidity provision when there is a lack of collateral in the economy. Their
intuition can be summarized as follows. When workers cannot commit to grant a credit
line to domestic firms (e.g. financial intermediaries have no adequate credibility), the
government can implicitly commit future taxpayers (the workers) to transfer resources
to bondholders (the entrepreneurs). In addition, Holmstrom and Tirole show that the
government intervention is welfare improving even in the presence of a domestic finan-
cial market for firm equities. Indeed, the shortage of collateral creates an under-supply
of private securities in the economy and, thus, poses a limit on the saving capacity of
firms. On the contrary, the government, thanks to its assumed ability to commit work-
ers’ income through taxation, can expand the supply of financial assets above the value
of private collateral.
Anecdotical evidence gives support to this argument. For example, Reinhart et al. (2003)
and Kumhof and Tanner (2005) observe that in many developing countries banks hold
large reserves of public debt (relatively to their net assets), which is then used as collat-
eral in private financial transactions. In particular, Kumhof and Tanner (2005) show that
the ratio of banks’ claims on the government over their net assets is negatively correlated
with an index of creditors right protection. It is also well known that turnover ratios in
secondary markets for government securities (in particular repo markets) have a greater
order of magnitude than in private financial markets, particularly in many emerging
markets (see de la Torre and Schmukler (2004)). Furthermore, although the theoretical
underpinning for government-supplied liquidity is stronger in emerging markets, it can
be argued that government debt also enhances the liquidity of more structured financial
markets, as shown by the policy discussion on the consequences of the US Treasury debt
paydown in late 90s (see Reinhart et al. (2000)).
It must be remarked that Holmstrom and Tirole’s argument depends crucially on the
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assumption that domestic firms cannot store liquidity by saving abroad. When there
are no restrictions on international capital flows and no sovereign risk, the interest rate
on government bonds is set by the world interest rate and entrepreneurs are indiffer-
ent between saving in the domestic public debt or saving abroad. In other words, the
IFM provides the economy with sufficient supply of liquidity and reduces the need for
government intervention. The following section, however, shows that, by relaxing the
government commitment assumption in the same setup as before, Holmstrom and Ti-
role’s argument can be restored in an open economy setting: as government repayment
becomes contingent on the state of the economy, public debt then represents an imper-
fectly substitutable source of liquidity for the domestic private sector. Nonetheless, the
optimal fiscal policy of the government has a downside, as it exposes the economy to
costly liquidity crises.
3 Sovereign risk and liquidity crises
In the previous section the government could perfectly commit to honor its obligations
in the future. Then, it could efficiently manage public debt to lessen domestic financial
inefficiencies and borrow foreign resources to undertake the public investment. Yet, the
long history of sovereign defaults in emerging markets suggests that the government
commitment is, at least, not fully credible. In the same setup as before, I then relax the
assumption of government commitment (Assumption 4) and I discuss the implications
that derive from the interaction between domestic financial frictions and sovereign risk.
In particular, I show that a sovereign default triggers a liquidity crisis within the economy
and that government debt represents an imperfectly substitutable source of liquidity for
the private sector.
Assumption 5 The government cannot commit to service its debt and creditors cannot
enforce the government repayment.
The absence of commitment introduces a classic unwillingness-to-pay problem. Ex-
post the government does not want to repay its debt with the IFM as this reduces
the average utility of domestic agents. Given that the IFM foresees the risk of future
opportunistic behavior, it doesn’t want to lend ex-ante and the government cannot
borrow from abroad. Conventional models in the sovereign debt literature usually restore
the ex-post incentive to repay by introducing either a default penalty or a reputational
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cost when a default occurs. These models can then sustain foreign lending in equilibrium.
Yet, these classic penalties have ambiguous empirical support. In this paper, I then
take a different perspective, which focuses on the direct consequences of default on the
domestic economy to support external debt.
As noted by Broner and Ventura (2006), the unwillingness-to-pay problem depends cru-
cially on the ability of the government to discriminate between domestic and foreign
bond holders. Indeed, when selective default on the IFM is not possible, the cost of
default is borne also by domestic agents and this reduces the attractiveness of the ex-
post opportunistic behavior. In the setup described previously, the non-discrimination
assumption has clear-cut implications. Given that a default on government bonds af-
fects the reserve of liquidity of domestic firms and precludes the profitable reinvestment
in distressed projects, the government has an ex-post incentive to honor its obligations.
This would be the case whenever the cost of a liquidity crisis within the economy exceeds
the cost of repaying foreign bond holders.
Assumption 6 The government cannot discriminate between domestic and foreign bond
holders.
Assumption 6 has both a theoretical and an empirical underpinning. Suppose that
government bonds are held by both domestic entrepreneurs and the IFM, and that agents
can trade the bond in a well-functioning secondary market. The latter assumption is
crucial to sustain Assumption 6. If bond holders were stuck with the bonds purchased
in the primary market, the government would be able perfectly to discriminate among
domestics and foreigners in each future date and the latter would never lend to the
government in the first place. Instead, when a secondary market for sovereign bonds is
in place, the government might not be able to track down the nationality of the ultimate
holder of each bond issued at date 0 and such lack of information would prevent a
selective default on the bonds held by the IFM. As observed by Broner and Ventura
(2006) and Panizza (2008), this informational flaw represents a widespread phenomenon
in emerging markets.16 The following quote from Reinhart et al. (2003) remarks the
same point: “the view that extemal debt is completely separable from domestically issued
debt is dead wrong”.
16Panizza (2008) reports that in most emerging countries governments commonly fail to keep track
of the large volumes of secondary market transactions and end up with almost no information on the
ultimate holders of debt.
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Broner et al. (2006) argue that the government has no even the incentive to acquire such
information, when secondary markets work perfectly. Indeed, if the government could
discriminate among domestic and foreign bond holders, the foreigners could unfold their
asset positions by selling the bond to domestics (which would buy the bond at any non-
negative discount) and would de facto receive their payment in any future contingency.
Then, if the government wants to avoid the repayment of foreigners, it must commit
to default on all bond holders indiscriminately (e.g., by not gathering information on
secondary market transactions and the ultimate bond holders). By doing so, the gov-
ernment would indeed gain an additional degree of freedom. The next subsection shows
that, in the specific case considered in my paper, the government’s commitment of non-
discriminating among domestics and foreigners introduces the possibility to choose a
contingent repayment policy, which depends on the trade-off between the cost of trans-
ferring resources to the IFM and the benefit of preserving domestic private sector’s
liquidity in any future contingency.
3.1 Equilibrium with sovereign risk
Recall now that agents are fully rational. Then, the equilibrium with sovereign risk
can be solved by backward induction, starting from date 1. Let b be the quantity of
government bonds held by domestic entrepreneurs, b∗ the quantity of government bonds
held by the IFM and θs ∈ {θ, θ¯} the realization of the aggregate productivity shock.
The government behaves strategically and chooses whether to repay the debt in order
to maximize the average consumption of domestic agents.
Debt repayment would implicitly transfer resources from domestic taxpayers (the work-
ers) to both domestic bond holders (the entrepreneurs) and foreign bond holders (the
IFM). The transfer to domestic entrepreneurs involves only a redistribution within the
economy. Given that the government does not care about wealth inequality, such a
transfer does not reduce aggregate welfare but improves liquidity provision and the
reinvestment of unlucky firms. On the other hand, the transfer to the IFM involves a
redistribution of resources away from the economy and, as long as the government does
not care about foreigners, it implies a loss of domestic welfare. Then, as the government
cannot discriminate among bond holders and selectively default on foreigners, it faces a
clear trade-off when choosing whether to repay or not.
In particular, the government repays its debt only when the benefits for the entrepreneurs
17




1 + θs(A− a)
]
b ≥ b∗ + b, (8)
where the left hand side measures the average consumption gain of entrepreneurs when
the government repays the bond and the right hand side measures the average consump-
tion loss of workers, in each realization of the aggregate shock θs.17
When the quantity b∗ of government bonds held by the IFM falls within the interval
[b∗(b), b¯∗(b)], where
b∗(b) ≡ {(1− γ) 12 [1 + θ (A− a)] − 1} b,
b¯∗(b) ≡ {(1− γ) 12 [1 + θ¯ (A− a)] − 1} b, (9)
the government repays the bond in the good state and defaults in the bad state. In the
latter case, indeed, aggregate productivity drops and the return on additional investment
declines. As a result, the social cost of a liquidity crisis is lower than the cost of repaying
foreigners and therefore the government repudiates its debt.
Suppose now that in equilibrium the government actually honors its obligations only in
the good state, that is b∗ ∈ [b∗(b), b¯∗(b)]. Then,
e =
{
1 if θs = θ¯ with prob. pi(θ¯)
0 if θs = θ with prob. 1− pi(θ¯)
, (10)
where e ∈ {0, 1} denotes the repayment choice of the government. The rest of the
analysis confirms this initial guess.
17The left hand side of (8) is obtained from rearranging the following formula,
Πe=1 −Πe=0 = (1− γ) 1
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+ ρ b+ f − i(e = 1)
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ak + (A− a) i(e = 0)
”
+ f − i(e = 0)
i)
where the first term is the average revenue of entrepreneurs when the government repays the bond
(e = 1), while the second term is the average revenue of entrepreneurs when the government does not
repay (e = 0). Then, substitute for i(e) = e ρ b + f , where ρ is the interest rate paid on government
bonds and is greater than one as long as government bonds feature the risk of a future default. Instead,
the right hand side of (8) is the value of taxes that the government collects from domestic workers to
repay the bond in t = 1, τ1 = ρ(b+ b
∗).
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Take now a step backward and consider date 0. Given that the government bond now
features the possibility of future repudiation, it must include a positive risk premium.





units of the private good in the good state of date 1 for any unit received at date 0, where
pi(θ¯) is the probability of the good state. As the repayment of government bonds now
depends on the state of the economy, as in (10), and includes a positive risk premium,
as in (11), at date 0 the representative entrepreneur foresees that, for any initial choice
{k, b, f}, his final output will be given by
yl(θs, e) = θsAk + e ρ b+ f
yu(θs, e) = θs
(
ak + (A− a) i(e)
)
+ e ρ b+ f − i(e)
, (12)
depending on whether he will be lucky or unlucky, where i(e) ≤ e ρ b + f . Then, the







yl(θs, e) + yu(θs, e)
2
]
− k − b− f, (13)
subject to the resource constraint at date 1, which is made contingent on the state of
the economy by government’s default, i.e. i ≤ e ρ b+ f , plus the maximum reinvestment
constraint, i ≤ k, and the positivity constraints on bond holdings, i.e. b ≥ 0 and f ≥ 0.
As in the previous section, the entrepreneur’s choice is subject to a borrowing constraint,
which is now given by









Once again, I ensure that the maximum reinvestment constraint is never binding in equi-
librium via Technical Assumption 2. Then, as additional investment is always profitable
for the entrepreneur, we can substitute for i(e) = e ρ b+ f in both (13) and (14).
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Technical assumption 2
The parameter γ satisfies the additional condition:





Before proceeding to the solution of program (13)-(14), it is worth remarking that the
representative entrepreneur is no longer indifferent between the government and the
foreign bond but he strictly prefers the former. This is a consequence of the procyclical
payouts of government bonds, which guarantee a greater liquidity provision when there
is a high return from additional investment. In order to show formally this result, let’s



















ak + θ¯(A− a)b+ (A− a)f
]
.
It is easy to see that government and foreign bonds are no longer perfect substitutes.
When the entrepreneur is unlucky, indeed, the return on savings in government bonds
is greater than the return on savings in foreign bonds as the entrepreneur benefits from
receiving a larger payment (due to the risk premium) when the state of the economy is
good and the return on additional investment is high. Therefore, when the representative
entrepreneur saves in the risky government bond rather than in the foreign risk-less bond,
the objective function (13) is shifted upward and the borrowing constraint (14) is looser.
As a result, the entrepreneur is unambiguously better off by saving exclusively in the
risky government bond.
Maximization of program (13)-(14) then implies the following optimal investment and
saving decisions,
k = k¯, b =
γA+a2 − 1
1− γ 12 [1 + θ¯(A− a)]
k¯ and f = 0. (15)
Similarly as before, the first condition takes into account that the entrepreneur wants to
maximize the expected return on initial investment, which is, by construction, unaffected
by the presence of sovereign risk. The second condition, instead, is obtained from the
borrowing constraint (14).
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The attentive reader could object that the result described by condition (15) crucially
depends on the assumed risk neutrality of domestic entrepreneurs. Indeed, if the rep-
resentative entrepreneur were risk-averse, they would seek to maximize his expected
utility rather than the expected output from the project. Then, although saving in the
procyclical government bond would raise the project’s expected output, the risk-averse
entrepreneur would prefer to smooth his future consumption by saving in the acyclical
foreign bond. Yet, this statement is not necessarily true when the IFM is risk neutral.18
In such a case, the representative entrepreneur will be facing a trade-off when choosing
to save in the government or in the foreign bond. On one hand, the higher expected
production, obtained by saving in the procyclical government bond, would relax the
borrowing constraint (14) and it would consent to store larger reserves of liquidity. On
the other hand, the possibility to smooth consumption across future states would bias
the entrepreneur’s preference towards the foreign bond, as it would increase his expected
utility. In the appendix, I show that, when the degree of risk aversion is sufficiently low,
condition (15) still holds in equilibrium and domestic firms save exclusively in govern-
ment bonds.
Consider now the problem of the benevolent government. As in the perfect commitment
case, the government choose public investment, debt issuance and individual taxation
in order to maximizes the average utility of domestic agents. Yet, the sovereign risk
friction poses a limit on the government’s ability to borrow from the IFM. Indeed, the
level of external debt must be now compatible with the ex-post incentive to pay of the
government.
Notice first that the government can no longer arbitrarily choose to issue short-term or
long-term debt. In particular, the government’s default is costly only when it involves
the repudiation of short-term debt. In this case, indeed, the default dries up domestic
liquidity and, as a result, the issuance of both domestic and external debt can be compat-
ible with the ex-post incentive to pay of the government. On the other hand, a default
on long-term debt would entail no losses for domestic firms: indeed, the announcement
of a default on long-term debt could be postponed until date 2, when unlucky firms
already financed the additional investment (by either pledging as collateral their bond
holdings or trading them in secondary markets).19 In the equilibrium with sovereign risk,
18The risk neutrality of the IFM is a standard assumption in the literature. The underlying idea is
that the IFM can perfectly diversify the aggregate risk associated with the investment in a small open
economy.
19Yet, long-term debt could be sustained if the government had some type of short-term commitment
(as in Broner et al. (2006)), which allows it to announce at date 1 whether it will repay the debt due at
21
then, the government can issue only short-term debt and repays it by collecting taxes
on domestic workers at date 1 (since taxation on entrepreneurs is costly, as discussed in
the perfect commitment case).
The problem of the government then involves the choice of the policy {g, b, b∗, τ(e)} that
maximizes,
W = Π(e) + w + υ(g)− τ(e) (16)
where Π(e) is the expected revenue of entrepreneurs, and is now conditional on the
government repayment choice, w is the labor income of workers, υ(g) is the average
utility of domestic agents from the public investment g and τ(e) denotes the expected
value of date 1 taxation on workers, i.e. τ(e) = pi(θ¯) ρ (b+ b∗). Beside the government’s
budget constraint,
g = b+ b∗ and τ(e) = b+ b∗, (17)
the government’s optimal policy is now subject to the incentive-compatibility constraint,
g ≤ b+ b¯∗(b), (18)
where b is determined by (15) and the external debt ceiling b¯∗(b) is defined as in (9).
That is, the government can borrow from private agents (namely, domestic entrepreneurs
and the IFM) only if they can rationally expect that the public debt will be repaid in at
least one state of the economy (the good state).
Supposing that the first-best investment in the public project is incompatible with fu-
ture repayment, it is possible to show that constraint (18) is binding in equilibrium.
Therefore, the equilibrium investment in the public project is given by the following
constrained-efficient level,
g = b+ b¯∗(b).
The government has, indeed, a twofold incentive to borrow up to the debt ceiling b +
b¯∗(b). On one side, the government can undertake a larger investment in the public
project, which enhances the welfare of all domestic agents. On the other side, such a





In spite of its simple structure, this model suggests a number of interesting implications.
Most notably, the model shows that external debt can emerge even in absence of “clas-
sic” penalties (e.g., trade sanctions and exclusion from international capital markets) or
reputational costs (as the model considers a one shot game). Indeed, the prospect of
triggering a liquidity crisis in the domestic economy restores the government incentive to
repay the debt and thereby its ex-ante ability to borrow from foreigners. In this respect,
my paper proposes a mechanism through which external debt can be sustained without
any intervention of foreign creditors. In particular, the mechanism considered differs
from the ones already discussed in the literature, e.g. Broner and Ventura (2006).20
These authors, indeed, consider an endowment economy where default leads to an un-
desirable redistribution of resources between domestic agents. In my model, instead,
sovereign default leads to a disruption of private investment.
Second, the model rationalizes the emergence of liquidity crises in the event of sovereign
default. When economic conditions are good (positive aggregate productivity or terms-
of-trade shocks), the government wants to transfer resources from taxpayers (the work-
ers) to domestic bondholders (the entrepreneurs) and repays the bond. Although such a
transfer is costly since it involves the repayment of foreign bondholders, the cost is more
than offset by large returns on firms’ reinvestment. On the contrary, when economic
conditions are bad (negative aggregate productivity or terms-of-trade shocks), the cock-
tail of high debt and low investment returns precipitates the economy into a liquidity
crisis triggered by sovereign default. The model then suggests that default episodes tend
to appear more likely in economies characterized by either volatile business cycle or,
if we were to consider the aggregate shock as a terms-of-trade shock, pronounced real
exchange rate fluctuations.
Concerning this second point, it is worth remarking that there has been a great deal of
discussion in the profession on possible reforms of the international financial architecture
in order to avoid the social costs associated with recent debt crises in emerging markets.21
A classic view in the literature is that default represents the only form of insurance
20Sandleris (2004) proposes a further mechanism through which sovereign default exerts a direct
consequence on the domestic private sector.
21See for instance the last chapter in Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer (2006).
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against adverse economic conditions available to sovereigns, despite the fact that it
is globally inefficient.22 As sovereign contractual arrangements do not allow to issue
contingent instruments, governments decide to default during bad times as an indirect
way to implement a contingent contract. Yet, default episodes are usually associated with
large dead-weight losses, given that the costs on creditors are not fully reflected in the
borrower’s benefits. Such inefficiency has then stimulated several proposal to improve the
effectiveness of bail-out programs which could provide an alternative source of insurance
to countries. The same considerations can be extrapolated from the previous model.
Yet, in my model, the source of the dead-weight loss is not the imposition of foreign
penalties, as usually considered, but it is the result of a domestic liquidity crunch.23 As
the model suggests that the source of social losses is to be looked for in the liquidity
crisis triggered by default and not in foreign penalties, this paper provides a theoretical
support for crises resolution policies that refuse to sacrifice domestic claims to service
external debt.
4 Institutional and Policy Reforms
The results discussed in the previous section depend crucially on the interaction be-
tween private capital markets imperfections and sovereign risk, and in particular on the
following frictions:
(i) the lack of firms’ collateral, as described in Assumption 1;
(ii) the missing market for private insurance, as described in Assumption 2;
(iii) the unwillingness-to-pay problem, as described in Assumptions 5 and 6.
The lack of collateral generates the need for liquidity of domestic firms. Were unlucky
firms able to guarantee to the IFM a non-negative return on the additional investment
i, i.e. γ θ(A − a) > 1, they would have no need to accumulate reserves of government
bonds. Indeed, unlucky firms would be able to borrow the resources they need (to offset
the expenditure shock) in the spot credit market at date 1. As already remarked before,
22Tomz and Wright (2007) provide empirical support to this view showing that sovereign defaults
occur more often during “bad times”.
23In general, trade sanctions or capital market exclusion represent a dead-weight welfare loss as they
reduce the gains from trade.
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the lack of firms’ collateral then makes domestic entrepreneurs willing to insure against
the expenditure shock, as they want to avoid a pitfall in the expected revenue from the
project.
The missing market for private insurance implies that domestic entrepreneurs are not
able efficiently to insure against the expenditure shock. Indeed, they cannot under-write
contingent contracts with the IFM, which promise a positive transfer when the firm is
unlucky in exchange for a positive payment when the firm is lucky. Absent contingent
contracts and given that borrowing at date 1 is not possible, the only alternative open
to entrepreneurs to buffer future shocks is to accumulate reserves of non-contingent
securities, which can be deployed in case of need.
Lastly, the unwillingness-to-pay problem, interacted with the two previous frictions,
exacerbates the financial instability of the domestic economy, as it introduces the risk
of widespread liquidity crises. When choosing whether to honor its debt obligations,
the government faces, indeed, a trade-off that depends on the state of the economy. As
previously shown, liquidity crises might arise when economic conditions deteriorate and
the government chooses opportunistically to default in order to avoid the repayment of
foreigners.
The purpose of this section is to discuss the legal and institutional reforms that could
improve private liquidity provision and reduce the economy’s exposure to government
debt. It should be now clear that, in this economy, such reforms would have to deal with
each one of the points enumerated above.
Clearly, reforms that raise the value of firms’ collateral (e.g. reforms of bankruptcy
procedures, improvements in accounting standards, information disclosure) would shift
upward the parameter γ, thereby relaxing the borrowing constraint of domestic en-
trepreneurs both at the initial investment stage (date 0) and along the production pro-
cess (date 1). Such reforms would then relax firms’ need to hoard liquidity and would
ultimately lead to deeper markets for private equities.
However, when the rise of private collateral is not followed by institutional and political
reforms that enhance the government’s credibility, deeper markets for private equities
could crowd out sovereign debt markets. The intuition is the following. As entrepreneurs
would have no need to save in government bonds, a default on public debt would have
no effect on the additional investment of domestic firms and the government would be
able to repudiate its debt at no cost. By foreseeing the risk of an opportunistic behavior
by the government, the IFM would refrain from buying public bonds. Such effect on
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the composition of international capital inflows in the economy would, nevertheless, fade
away as soon as the government acquires a credible commitment technology.24
Yet, it could be argued that the lack of collateral and the absence of government’s com-
mitment, i.e. points (i) and (iii), might also depend on factors not directly related to
the improvement of the legal and institutional environment. In particular, there might
be technological reasons that avoid the build-up of firms’ collateral, e.g. specialization
in sectors with low asset tangibility, and political, technological and social reasons that
might jeopardize the future solvency of the government, e.g. political instability, exces-
sive reliance on natural resources having volatile returns, social unrest and civil wars.
For these reasons, in the following analysis I will maintain the assumptions that the
economy suffers from a lack of private collateral and the government’s commitment is
not credible. Instead, I will focus more specifically on friction (ii), which, arguably, is
more closely related to the state of legal institutions in the country.
4.1 Endogenous insurance provision
So far, the inability of domestic firms to get insurance from the IFM has been considered
as an exogenous feature of the economy. As argued before, this assumption stands
on the presence of moral hazard issues on the firm side. This section analyzes the
government incentive to improve domestic regulation in order to relax this friction. The
ultimate purpose of this analysis is to describe the economic conditions that lead to such
reforms.
24As discussed in Henry and Lorentzen (2003), the distinction between equity and debt flows is critical
to assess the benefits from global financial liberalization. Equity contracts create risk-sharing as they
involve procyclical payouts and can therefore lead to balance-of-payment stabilization. Debt contracts,
instead, require constant payments regardless of economic conditions and can potentially provoke sudden
flows reversals when investors become concerned about either the liquidity or the solvency of the bor-
rower. A prudent international financial architecture should then favor equity flows. Nonetheless, debt
flows (with a preponderance of public and publicly-guaranteed debt flows) constitute a prominent share
of total capital inflows in developing countries (see for instance Table 4 in Henry (2007)). Therefore,
“the critical issue is what distortions in the international financial system produce incentives that lead to
so much debt and so little equity” (Henry (2007)). A vast macroeconomic literature points the finger to
a weak protection of the rights of equity investors in developing countries. Yet, as poor creditor rights
protection is usually correlated with low credibility of governments, this argument can account for the
low levels of equity flows but it cannot convincingly explain why debt flows are so large (in relative
terms). Indeed, the risk of debt repudiation should deter debt flows. The novelty of this paper is then
to study how the lack of private collateral shapes the sovereign incentive to repay its debt. In doing so,
it can explain why, in countries characterized by a weak legal enforcement, foreign investors substitute
equity contracts with debt contracts rather than simply refrain from investing in the country. Whilst in
the former case the composition of capital flows changes, as suggested by data, in the latter case total
capital inflows would decline without a necessary effect on their composition.
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Suppose that in this economy there exist two types of firms, which I call respectively
“good” and “bad”. In particular, good firms can obtain insurance from the IFM which
commits to provide a contingent credit line when the firm receives an adverse shock (in
exchange for an initial payment). The idea is that good firms represents strictly regulated
and actively monitored companies where moral hazard issues are negligible. Bad firms,
instead, represents poorly regulated companies which are not able to get insurance and
therefore must save in non-contingent government bonds in order to buffer future shocks.
In addition, the proportion of good firms in the economy is endogenously determined by
the government’s decision to reform domestic regulation.
Assumption 2’ A fraction λ of domestic firms (good firms) can enter into state-
contingent contracts with the IFM. The remaining fraction of domestic firms (bad firms)
cannot enter into state-contingent contracts. The government can costlessly increase the
fraction λ by improving domestic regulation.
In choosing the new regulation, the government faces a clear trade-off. On one side,
the government can raise the fraction of firms that are able efficiently to insure against
adverse shocks. On the other hand, as more firms can insure using contingent insurance
contracts rather than hoarding reserves of public bonds, the ex-post incentive to repay
of the government declines. The IFM, fearing future defaults, would then stop purchas-
ing bonds from the government, which is forced to forgo the investment in the public
project. At some point, however, the return on public investment grows so much that
the government has no more incentive to improve domestic regulation.
In order to describe the equilibrium for this new setup, it is convenient to consider a
simple case where there is only the idiosyncratic expenditure shock. Hence, throughout
this section there are no aggregate productivity shocks and the aggregate productivity
θ is normalized to one. This assumption does not affect the relative revenues of good
and bad firms. Indeed, as contingent insurance contracts can be made contingent on
the aggregate productivity shock as government bonds (which would be contingent on
the realization of aggregate productivity as a result of government’s default), the differ-
ence between the two types of assets is independent on the presence of the aggregate
shock.
Yet, when there are no aggregate shocks, there will be no sovereign default in equi-
librium. As private agents can now perfectly foresee the future (i.e., the equilibrium
is deterministic), they limit their purchases of public bonds in order to preserves the
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government’s ex-post incentive to honor its obligations. In this case, the interest rate
on government bonds is set by the world interest rate and domestic (bad) firms are in-
different between saving in the domestic public debt or saving abroad (as in the perfect
commitment case). In this section, though, I focus on the equilibrium in which domestic
(bad) firms save only in government bonds (and not in foreign bonds). The implicit as-
sumption, here, is that, as domestic savings in public bonds permit to sustain a positive
level of external debt, the government can coordinate domestic entrepreneurs to save
exclusively in government bonds.
4.1.1 Equilibrium
Let’s first derive the expected revenue for a bad firm and a good firm. As the reform
raises the number of good firms in the economy, the marginal benefit of the reform is
given by the difference between the two revenues.
Consider first a bad firm which can only save in government bonds. As there are no
aggregate shocks, there is no sovereign default in equilibrium and it is possible to show
that the optimal investment and saving decisions of the representative bad firm are
pinned down by condition (5).25 Substituting for these conditions, the expected revenue
of bad firms is equal to
ΠB = (1− γ)
A+a
2 − δ(A− a)
1− γ δ(A− a) k¯,




< 1 as (A− a) > 1.
Consider now a good firm. In this case, the entrepreneur can buy a contingent security
that promises a unit of good if the firm receives the expenditure shock. Let x denote the
number of securities purchased by the entrepreneur in the initial period. As agents are
risk neutral, the price q of the contingent security has to be actuarial fair in equilibrium,
i.e. q = 12 . Therefore, by borrowing an amount k +
1
2x at date 0, the representative
entrepreneur of a good firm can get as final outputs
yGl = Ak and yGu = ak + (A− a)x (19)
where x ≤ k, depending on being lucky or unlucky. Substituting for (19) into the
25Notice that I set f = 0 in condition (5), as above discussed.
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entrepreneur’s problem (3)-(4), the expected revenue of a good firm is given by
ΠG = (1− γ)
A+a
2 − (A− a)
1− γ (A− a) k¯,









, the first order derivative of ΠB with respect to δ
is positive and therefore,
ΠG > ΠB,
since δ < 1. In addition, the difference in the revenues of good and bad firms is increasing
in the expected productivity of domestic projects, i.e. A+a2 .
Although the reform raises the expected revenue of domestic firms, the government
incentive to improve domestic regulation declines with the number of good firms in the
economy. As discussed above, indeed, the reform reduces the ability of the government to
borrow (both from domestic and foreign investors) making the public good provision to
fall. At some point, then, the cost of increasing the number of good firms in the economy
(measured by the marginal return on public goods) exceeds its benefit (measured by the
difference between good firms’ and bad firms’ profits) and the government would stop
improving the domestic regulation. In particular, the government chooses the number
of good firms λ and the policy {g, b, b∗, τ},26 in order to maximize the social welfare
function,
W = λΠG + (1− λ)ΠB + w + υ(g)− τ,
subject to the budget constraints,
g = b+ b∗ and τ = b+ b∗,
and the incentive-compatibility constraint,




26Notice that the government can only issue short-term debt. As discussed in section 3, indeed, a
government’s default generates a cost for the domestic economy only when it involves the repudiation of
short-term debt.
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(1− γ) δ(A− a) − 1
]
b
is the maximum level of borrowing from foreign investors sustainable in equilibrium.
Supposing that the incentive-compatibility constraint is binding in equilibrium (i.e. the
first best investment is not incentive-compatible), maximization of the social welfare
function with respect to λ implies the equilibrium conditions,
λ = 1− Λυ′−1
(
1 + Λ(ΠG −ΠB)
)
,
g = (1− λ) Λ,
where Λ = 1(1−γ)δ(A−a)b > 0.
As the function υ(·) is strictly increasing and concave, it is easy to see that the govern-
ment’s decision to increase the number of good firms in the economy depends positively
on the average productivity of private projects (as ΠG − ΠB is increasing in A+a2 ) and
negatively on domestic agents’ marginal utility from the public good. The model then
describes the economic conditions that lead to better regulation. Consider for instance
an emerging country with a scarce level of public infrastructures and human capital and
highly specialized in small scale labor intensive sectors. Standard growth and trade the-
ories predict large returns on public investment and small returns on private investment
in physical capital. In such a case, the government would have almost no incentive to
improve domestic regulation as the returns on public investment in both public infras-
tructures and education are large relative to the benefits from private investment. As
ultimate outcome, the domestic financial system would be characterized by a prepon-
derance of public debt instruments and scarce insurance access of domestic firms. On
the contrary, in countries characterized by a good supply of public infrastructure and
large returns on private projects, the benevolent government would more likely under-
take reforms that reduce moral hazard issues and enhance more sophisticated form of
insurance available to domestic firms.
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5 Sovereign defaults and liquidity crises: some empirical
evidence
As discussed in previous sections, sovereign default triggers a liquidity crisis within the
economy. In particular, it dries up the private sector’s reserves of liquidity and thus
reduces both reinvestment and final output of domestic firms. Although the model takes
a representative agent perspective, it is natural to think that firms with larger liquidity
needs will experience sharper consequences in the event of default. In this section, I
provide cross-country, cross-industry empirical evidence that is suggestive of the mech-
anism emphasized by the model. More specifically, the empirical strategy consists in
using cross-country data on manufacturing sectors to test whether industries highly de-
pendent on external finance and with large working capital needs experience sharper
contractions in the event of default. Since the seminal contribution of Rajan and Zin-
gales (1998), scholars have been looking at the performance of industries with different
reliance on financial intermediation in order to derive implications on the real effects
of cross-country, cross-time variation in financial institutions. In this paper, I apply a
similar methodology to inspect whether industries with high liquidity needs and strong
dependence on external finance experience a disproportionate output contraction in the
event of default, as suggested by the theoretical model.
Nevertheless, it is fair to say that the empirical analysis here performed cannot be con-
sidered as a proper test of the model, but rather a way to provide empirical evidence
consistent with its predictions. Indeed, there exist alternative theories that predict a
disproportional effect of sovereign default on industries that rely on external sources of
finance. In particular, if a sovereign default provokes a sudden stop in foreign lending,
financially dependent industries would likely suffer the most. In this case, the empirical
evidence would be consistent with the prediction of my model, but the mechanism in
place would be different from the one I suggest. As commonly recognized, the identifi-
cation of the exact nature of the costs associated with sovereign default is not an easy
task, given that such costs could arise either from direct sanctions, loss of access to in-
ternational markets or, as here supposed, from an economy-wide liquidity crisis.27 One
advantage of using the cross-industry variation within each country is that it is possible
to control for country-wide characteristics, as for instance the degree of capital account
liberalization (and thus the effects captured hold for any level of penetration of foreign
27Refer to Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer (2006) for a survey of the most influential empirical attempts
in this respect.
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financial institutions in the domestic credit market). Yet, although this methodology
permits to reduce the omitted variable criticism, the reader should be aware of potential
identification pitfalls, as above described.
This empirical hypothesis is tested using the dynamic panel data model,





βF,τ FinDepi + βL,τ Liqi + βX,τ Xi
)
·DEFc,t−τ + i,c,t,
where the (log) value added in industry i of country c in time t, yi,c,t, is fitted us-
ing the lagged dependent variable to control for mean reverting dynamics and a set of
industry-country, αi,c, industry-time, λi,t, and country-time, µc,t, fixed effects to control
for additional explanatory variables omitted in the regression. Notice that the average
effect of default on manufacturing production is captured by the country-time fixed ef-
fect µc,t. Lastly, the above specification includes a set of interaction terms constructed
using a default indicator DEFc,t−τ , which takes a value of one if country c defaulted τ
years ago, and a variety of industry characteristics. In particular, FinDepi is a mea-
sure of an industry’s dependence on external finance, Liqi is a measure of an industry’s
need for liquidity and Xi is a variable set of additional industry characteristics which
is used to check the robustness of the results to the inclusion of further controls. An
important aspect of this specification is that both financial dependence and liquidity
needs are computed using data on US industries and do not vary across countries. This
assumption is standard in the empirical literature that built on Rajan and Zingales
(1998). The economic justification for using a country-invariant index based on US data
(where financial frictions are arguably negligible) is to isolate technological differences
that affect each industry’s demand for both external finance and liquidity from coun-
try characteristics that affect their supply (as for instance different degrees of financial
development).28 Furthermore, as long as those technological differences are likely to per-
sist across countries, these US-based indexes are valid proxies for the relative financial
needs of industries based in other countries. Given that FinDepi and Liqi take higher
values when an industry shows greater financial dependence and higher liquidity needs,
negative coefficients on the interaction terms, i.e. βF < 0 and βL < 0, suggest that this
industry experiences sharper output losses in the event of default.
28See Rajan and Zingales (1998) for a similar justification.
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5.1 Econometric methodology
This subsection describes the econometric methodology applied to estimate equation
(20). First, I remove the industry-time effects, λi,t and the country-time effects, µc,t, by
industry-time and country-time differencing prior to estimation, i.e. all instruments and
all regressors are differenced by subtracting the mean for each industry and each time
period and then by subtracting the mean for each country and each time period. In
particular, the average effect of default on all industries in a given country is captured
by the country-time effect µc,t and therefore does not appear in the final results. Second,
the presence of the lagged dependent variable among regressors affects the consistency
of the within estimator used in static panel data. As reviewed in Bond (2002), the
standard procedure in dynamic panel data models is then to use a Generalized Method
of Moments (GMM) estimator after first-differencing the data (with the exception of the
terms interacted with the default dummy in this particular study) in order to eliminate
the industry-country fixed effects. This method was first proposed by Holtz-Eakin et al.
(1988) and Arellano and Bond (1991). As instruments to set the identifying moment
conditions, I use the first lag the lagged dependent variable, taken in levels. Instead, the
interaction between the default dummies and the industry characteristics are assumed
to be fully exogenous and, to the extent that the model is already over-identified, are
not used as instruments.29 In addition, a number of statistical tests apply to control
the validity of the assumptions on which the GMM difference estimator is based, as
suggested by Arellano and Bond. The first is a Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions
that tests the validity of the instruments. The second is a test of second-order serial
correlation in the error term. Baltagi (1995) (p. 131), indeed, stresses that a crucial
assumption to apply this method is that the differenced error term is MA(1) and therefore
its autocorrelation must fade away after the first lag.
5.2 Data
Data on manufacturing industries are obtained from the INDSTAT3 2005 database
available from the United Nations Industrial Development Organization. The UNIDO
database reports annual data for value added in each manufacturing sector at the 3-digit
29In particular, I would like to stress that the sovereign default represents an exogenous shock in the
dynamics of sectoral outputs. Indeed, this assumption would fail only if governments repudiate their
debt when financially dependent industries perform relatively poorly. Though, this appears to be quite
unrealistic since a default possibly reflects a widespread economic downturn rather than a localized
sectoral contraction.
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ISIC classification for a broad sample of countries starting from the 1960s. Original data
in current US dollars are first converted in constant prices using the US GDP deflator,
as reported in the World Bank’s World Development Indicators 2006. As reported in
the data appendix, I impose some restrictions to the original data in order to reduce
measurement errors and sporadic observations. This is a standard procedure in previous
studies employing the same database, which tend to be quite noisy.
Following Rajan and Zingales (1998), the financial dependence index, FinDeps, mea-
sures the share of investment that is not financed with cash flow from operations. I take
the data from Kroszner et al. (2007), who report the Rajan and Zingales’ index over the
period 1980-1999 on a three-digit ISIC level (rather than a mixture of three-digit and
four-digit levels). Based on U.S. publicly listed firm data, this index arguably reflects
technological characteristics of industries that are relatively stable across space and time.
The original data are, then, normalized such that they range from 0 to 1, with a higher
number indicating greater financial dependence. This eases results readability.
The measure of industry liquidity needs, Liqs, is defined following Raddatz (2006). His
measure is computed as the median ratio of inventories over annual sales of US public
manufacturing firms from Compustat, in the same spirit as the Rajan and Zingales’s
measure of external dependence. This ratio captures the fraction of inventories that can
be financed with ongoing revenue and, arguably, is particularly suitable for capturing
technological aspects that shape liquidity needs. In particular, firms’ needs for working
capital raise with the spell of the production process: indeed, the longer the production
process the larger is the value of inventories over current sales. Once again, I take the
data from Kroszner et al. (2007), who report the Raddatz index over the period 1980-
1999 on a three-digit ISIC level (rather than a four-digit level as in the original Raddatz
measure). Notice that the correlation between the external dependence index, FinDeps,
and the liquidity needs index, Liqs, is low (0.09) and not statistically different from zero,
suggesting that the two index capture different aspects of an industry’s financial needs.
In particular, the Raddatz measure is specifically designed to capture very short term
working capital needs, while the Rajan and Zingales index represents a broader measure
of financial needs which does not necessarily distinguish between the short-term and the
long-term horizon.
In order to control for additional industry characteristics, Xs, that might affect industry
performance in the event of default, I include in the main specification the interaction
terms between the default indicator and two more industry-specific indexes: namely,
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an index of assets’ tangibility, Tangs, and an index of export orientation, ExpOrs,c.
The former index is computed as the median ratio of fixed assets over total assets for
US firms in the period 1980-1999 at the 3-digit ISIC classification and is taken from










In words, ExpOrs,c is the average share of exports over total sales. Notice that the
export orientation index cannot be computed using only US data, as the other industry
characteristics. Indeed, the crucial assumption in the Rajan and Zingales methodology is
that the rank of US industries based on financial needs is maintained across all countries
(if an industry is more financially dependent in the US it is likely to be more financially
dependent also in Argentina). Whilst this assumption is reasonable when it refers to
financial needs, it is likely to be rejected when we look at industries’ export orientation
since technological factors do predict that the export orientation of industries in different
countries is shaped by country-specific comparative advantages (if a US industry exports
more with respect to other industries, this does not imply that the same industry in
Argentina will export more than other Argentine industries). The data source used to
construct the export orientation index is Nicita and Olarreaga (2001), who report export
and import values for each ISIC industry.
Data on default episodes are sourced from the Standard and Poor’s sovereign default
database, as reported in Beers and Chambers (2002). This database includes all sovereign
defaults on loans or bonds with private agents between 1975 and 2002, and reports the
period during which the debtor government remained in default. The immediate effect
of default is captured giving a value of one to the dummy variable in the first year of
each default episode. Finally, the resulting sample includes 28 manufacturing sectors
in a cross-section of 108 countries over the period 1980-2002, although the sectoral
representation can vary across countries and years.
5.3 Results
Table 3 reports the one-step first-differenced GMM estimates of (20) where I do not
include positive lags for the default indicator (i.e. T = 0) in order to focus on the
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instantaneous effects of default. Furthermore, table 3 reports the main estimates for
1980-1990 sample and for the 1990-2002 sample to check the time stability of the key
coefficients over the two periods. Notice, first, that the autocorrelation coefficient ρ
is statistically significant and pretty stable over the different specifications. A back-
of-envelope calculations suggests that temporary shocks to sectoral output are quite
persistent over time, with an implied persistency of about three years.
Turning to the interaction between sovereign default and industry characteristics, the
point estimates of βF and βL have negative sign over all specifications and this result
suggests that industries with high dependence on external finance and high liquidity
needs experience a disproportionate contraction in the event of sovereign default. Yet,
the results also show that this effect is statistically significant and robust to the inclusion
of additional industry controls only in the sub-period 1990-2002. This result does not
imply a rejection of the theoretical model, but, possibly, a stronger support for it. In-
deed, a crucial assumption in the model, namely the non-discrimination between foreign
and domestic bond holders, suits more realistically the institutional set-up of sovereign
debt markets in the 1990s. As noted by Broner and Ventura (2006), during the 1980s
most sovereign borrowing was granted by foreign financial institutions in the form of
syndicated bank loans, whilst private national financial markets were highly segmented.
“This institutional setup clearly facilitates ex-post discrimination, as governments can
choose not to pay foreign banks without interfering with domestic asset trade.” Dur-
ing the 1990s, instead, many governments in emerging markets started to issue debt in
the form of anonymous bonds, which are highly traded in secondary markets. In these
economies, governments usually fail to keep track of the large volumes of transaction in
public bond secondary market and end up with almost no information of the ultimate
holders of debt (Panizza (2008)). Finally, notice that the effect captured by coefficient
β1 is also economically significant, as it implies that, in the first year of a default episode,
the level of output in the most financially dependent sector (Transportation equipment)
is roughly a 27 percent lower than the output in the least financially dependent one
(Tobacco), after controlling for additional industry characteristics.
Finally, I inspect whether the effect of default on different industries is persistent over
time by adding up to 2 lags of for interaction terms between the default indicator and
each industry characteristics to the baseline specification (20). The results are reported
in table 3. In particular, the results obtained suggest that the disproportional effect of
sovereign default on financially dependent industries decays very rapidly, as the coeffi-
cient on the lagged interaction terms are never statistically significant.
36
In conclusion, the evidence show that default episodes are associated with a dispro-
portional output contraction in industries that rely extensively on external sources of
finance. In particular, there is no significant evidence suggesting that sovereign default
determines a decline in industries where the demand for external finance is specifically
targeted to the very short-term. Yet, while the theoretical model suggests that sovereign
default might be connected with a widespread credit crunch within the economy, it does
not univocally predict whether the consequences of default are different between indus-
tries with short or medium term liquidity needs.
6 Conclusion
Sovereign debt crises in emerging markets are usually associated with financial turmoil
and liquidity crises throughout the economy. This connection is suggested by both anec-
dotical and empirical evidence. In particular, defaults episodes appear to lead banking
crises. However, there is no clear evidence supporting the application of foreign penalties
when default occurs.
This paper then proposes a novel mechanism linking sovereign defaults with liquidity
and banking crises without any intervention of foreign creditors. The model considers
a standard unwillingness-to-pay problem assuming that: (i) the enforcement of private
contracts is limited and, as a result, public debt represents a source of liquidity; (ii)
the government cannot discriminate between domestic and foreign agents. The model
shows that external debt might emerge even in absence of classic penalties imposed by
foreign creditors. Indeed, the prospect of triggering a liquidity crisis throughout the
economy restores the ex-post incentive to pay of the government. Nonetheless, liquidity
crises might arise when economic conditions deteriorate and the government chooses
opportunistically to default in order to avoid the repayment of foreign agents.
This paper then contributes to a recent strand of the sovereign debt literature that fo-
cuses on the direct consequences of sovereign default on the domestic economy, most
notably Broner and Ventura (2006). Yet, the mechanism and, thereby the consequences
arising in the event of default, differ from the one highlighted by these authors. In their
setup, a sovereign default leads to an undesirable redistribution of resources within the
economy. In my model, instead, sovereign default leads to a disruption of private invest-
ment. Along different lines, these two papers suggest a remarkable policy implication:
as they show that the source of the costs associated with default is to be looked for
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in the direct consequences on the domestic private sector and not in foreign penalties,
these papers provide a theoretical underpinning for crises resolution policies that refuse
to sacrifice domestic claims to service external debt.
Finally, this paper provides a fully-fledged framework to think about domestic legal and
institutional reforms. Different types of reforms are considered and, for each one of them,
the implications on international capital flows are remarked. In particular, the model
shows that government’s incentive to undertake a legal reform is positively related to the
average return on private investment and negatively to the return on public investment.
The paper then suggests a possible explanation for cross-country and cross-time variation
in legal institutions which differs from studies stressing political economy issues.
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A A snapshot of the Argentine crisis
After being almost fatally wounded by the shock wave of the Mexican Tequila Crisis in
1994-1995, the Argentinean banking system was deeply reformed by the introduction of
a new regulatory regime, called BASIC, designed following the international standards
in the Basel Accord. As reported by Mishkin (2006) in his recent book The Next Great
Globalization, the reform was instigated by concerns raised by depositors’ run on domes-
tic banks and the consequent decline in bank lending to non-financial companies which
drove the Argentine economy into a recession. The new regime had “strict liquidity
requirements, which required banks to hold 20% of short-term deposits in safe and liquid
assets”. Though, from the Basel Accord it inherited “a weighting scheme for measuring
bank risk according to which government bonds were classified as being the least risky of
all assets that a bank could hold” designed to fit advanced countries better than emerg-
ing markets. Thus, at the outset of the 2001 crisis Argentine banks were already major
holders of government debt and the banks’ exposure grew further when the limits on
the share of government bonds in bank reserves were lifted to allow the central govern-
ment to collocate additional debt: “the banks went along because, with their high interest
rates, the bonds would be very profitable if the government avoided default”. By then, the
stability of the banking system was compromised. When the government announced a
temporary suspension of debt payments and, soon after, abandoned the currency board,
most firms were declared insolvent on their dollar-denominated debts and the strength
of bank balance sheets was seriously undermined by large losses in both the defaulted
government debt and private loans. That precarious situation was further exacerbated
by the subsequent asymmetric pesofication of bank loans and deposits. With banks not
granting new loans, businesses dramatically cut back on their spending, aggravating fur-
ther the economic downturn. While the trigger of the Argentine debt crisis is arguably
in four external shocks (namely, the appreciation of the US dollar, the decline in the
terms of trade, the Russian crisis and the Brazilian exchange rate crisis), Mishkin’s anal-
ysis shows that the cost of the government’s default was substantially magnified by the
destabilization of the internal credit market.
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B Theoretical appendix
B.1 Precautionary savings and equity markets.
This section shows formally how the lack of collateral causes an under-supply of pri-
vate equities in the economy and thereby limits the ability of firms to save the optimal
amount of resources. Instead the government intervention, by committing workers’ in-
come via taxation, adds to private collateral and expands the supply of securities in the
economy.
Let yγ = γ
[
E[A]k + 12(A− a)i
]
denote the maximum number of equities that each
entrepreneur can issue at date 0. Each equity assigns to its holder an ownership right on
one unit of the expected production (or equivalently a unit share of production in each
state). Given that agents are risk neutral, the price of each equity is then equal to one.
In order to finance the initial investment the entrepreneur issues a quantity α yγ = k of
equities to foreign investors. Then, he trades the remaining quantity b = (1 − α) yγ to
constitute a portfolio of all firm’s equities. Indeed, although the entrepreneur is risk-
neutral, he wants to diversify among all firms’ equities in order to maximize the value
of his portfolio at date 1 and therefore increase the additional reinvestment in his own
project. Using symmetry, the value of market portfolio is equal to b. The problem of









ak + (A− a)i+ b− i
2
)
− k − b (21)
where k+b denotes the expected dividend paid to shareholders, subject to the borrowing
constraint,











plus the constraint on the maximum number of equities that can be issued,











Notice that in equilibrium constraint (22) is never binding and can be omitted. The
entrepreneur’s problem is very similar to problem (3)-(4). In particular, the objective
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function is identical in the two cases. Nonetheless, constraint (23) imposes a tighter
restriction than constraint (4). Therefore, when they save in private equities, domestic
firms are not able to get the same revenues that they would obtain when they can save
in the government bonds. As this follows from the inclusion of constraint (23) in the
entrepreneur’s problem, this result depends on a shortage of aggregate collateral which
generates an under-supply of private securities.
B.2 Sovereign risk and risk aversion
Suppose that domestic firms are risk-averse and the IFM is risk neutral. Let U define















where u(·) is increasing and concave, cl(θs, e) = yl(θs, e)− rl(θs)(k + b+ f) denotes the
consumption of lucky entrepreneurs for each realization of θs, cu(θs, e) = yu(θs, e) −
ru(θs)(k+ b+ f) denotes the consumption of lucky entrepreneurs, yl(θs, e) and yu(θs, e)









given that the IFM is risk-neutral and competitive. Then, the problem of the repre-
sentative entrepreneur is defined by the maximization of (24), subject to (25) and the
borrowing constraint,






























yl(θs, e) + yu(θs, e)
2
]
− (k + b+ f)
 ,
after substituting for (25) in both (24) and (26). Notice, first, that the optimal initial
investment k is still equal to k¯. Indeed, as initial investment is, by construction, profitable
for both the entrepreneur and the IFM, the entrepreneur, by investing up to k¯, can
increase both his expected utility and he can relax the borrowing constraint (26). That is,
he faces no trade-off when choosing the initial investment k. Let’s, then, focus exclusively


























































































































































































Notice now that the first rows of equation (29) and (30) are identical and let κ denote
their value. In addition, recall that 1 − pi(θ¯) = pi(θ). Finally, the representative en-
trepreneur’s problem admits an interior solution for b and f , i.e. b ≥ 0 and f ≥ 0,




















)} = 1+θ¯(A−a)2 − 11+(A−a)
2 − 1
(31)
On the contrary, when the left hand side of (31) exceeds the right hand side, b > 0 and
f = 0, and viceversa. Notice now that the left hand side is decreasing in the degree of
concavity of the function u(·), or the degree of risk aversion of domestic entrepreneurs.
Given that the left hand side is strictly greater than the right hand side (so b > 0 and f =
0 as showed in the main text), there exists at least one concave utility function such that
the left hand side is strictly greater than the right hand side and the entrepreneur chooses
to save in the procyclical government bond, despite being risk averse. Nonetheless, as
the degree of risk aversion of domestic entrepreneurs increases, the optimal saving choice
of domestic firms would involve only the purchase of foreign riskless bonds.
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C Data Description
Log Value Added (y). Log of value added in US dollars at the 3-digit ISIC classi-
fication for manufacturing sectors. Data are sourced from the UNIDO INDSTAT 2005
database. Original data are deflated using the GDP deflator in United States from the
World Bank’s World Development Indicators 2006 CD-ROM.
Default Dummy (DEF ). Dummy variable taking a value one in the first year of
a default episode. Data on default episodes are sourced from the Standard and Poor’s
sovereign default database, as reported in Beers and Chambers (2002). This database in-
cludes all sovereign defaults on loans or bonds with private agents between 1975 and 2002,
and reports the period during which the debtor government remained in default.
Financial Dependence (FinDep). An index constructed as the median share of cap-
ital expenditures not financed with the cash flow from operations (capital expenditures
minus cash flow from operation divided by capital expenditures) by US-based, publicly
listed firms. The index is sourced from Kroszner et al. (2007), who provide a 3-digit ISIC
based reclassification of the data originally constructed by Rajan and Zingales (1998)
for a mixture of 3-digit and 4-digit ISIC sectors. The data refer to the period 1980-1999
and, originally, range from -1.14 (Tobacco) to 0.72 (Transport equipment), with a higher
number indicating greater financial dependence. To ease statical inference, I normalize
the index such that it ranges from 0 to 1.
Liquidity Needs (Liq). An index constructed as the median ratio of inventories over
total sales for US-based, publicly listed firms. This index has been initially proposed by
Raddatz (2006) to measure industrys financial needs that focuses on short-term liquidity
needs. The data are sourced from Kroszner et al. (2007), who compute the Raddatz index
for the 3-digit ISIC manufacturing sectors. The data refer to the 1980s and, originally,
range from 0.07 (Tobacco) to 0.72 (Plastic Products), with a higher number indicating
greater financial dependence. To ease statical inference, I normalize the index such that
it ranges from 0 to 1.
Tangibility (Tangs). An index constructed as the median ratio of net property, plant
and equipment to total assets by US-publicly listed firms during the period 1980-1999
in each 3-digit ISIC manufacturing sector. The data are sourced from Kroszner et al.
(2007). The original data range from 0.12 to 0.62, and are normalized such that they
range from 0 to 1.
ExpOrs,c. An index of export orientation computed as the average share of exports
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over total sales for each industry in each country included in the sample. The data
source used to construct the export orientation index is Nicita and Olarreaga (2001),
who report export and import values for each ISIC industry.
C.1 Deletion criteria
First, I delete all observations for which the data for value added are either missing or
negative. Second, given that the initial panel is unbalanced, I remove all sector-country-
year observations with data for less than 5 years. This reduces the within estimator’s
sensitivity to isolated observations in the panel. Third, I exclude all country-year pairs
reporting data for less than 10 sectors, in order to guarantee sufficient within country-
year variation in the interaction between financial dependence and default (captured by
the coefficient β1). The same criterium is applied in Borensztein and Panizza (2006).
Fourth, I drop those observations for which the growth rate of value added fall in the
top and bottom 1 percent of the distribution. This is a common strategy in order to
limit the noise created by outliers.
50











































Table 2: Estimation Results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1980-1990 1980-1990 1990-2002 1990-2002 1990-2002
ys,c,t−1 0.373*** 0.375*** 0.455*** 0.454*** 0.483***
(0.054) (0.054) (0.059) (0.059) (0.055)
DEFc,t · FinDeps -0.094 -0.097 -0.208* -0.196* -0.275*
(0.070) (0.071) (0.117) (0.117) (0.148)
DEFc,t · Liqs -0.092* -0.069 -0.053 -0.126 -0.093
(0.052) (0.069) (0.088) (0.115) (0.125)
DEFc,t · Tangs 0.033 -0.115 -0.044
(0.065) (0.116) (0.143)
DEFc,t · ExpOrs,c -0.078
(0.160)
1st autocorr. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
2nd autocorr. 0.00 0.00 0.42 0.42 0.27
Sargan test 0.00 0.00 0.21 0.21 0.12
Obs. 15406 15406 15605 15605 12828
∗∗∗,∗∗ ,∗ represent significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. The table reports
the one-step first-differenced GMM estimator for the main specifications for the 1980-
1990 and the 1990-2002 samples. The set of instruments includes the first lag of the
lagged dependent variable. Country-time effects are removed by country-time differenc-
ing prior to estimation. Sector-country fixed effects are removed by first differencing.
Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are reported within parenthesis. 1st auto-
corr. and 2nd autocorr. are autocorrelation tests on the estimation residuals. p-values
for the asymptotic N(0, 1) distribution are reported. The Sargan test of over-identifying
restrictions is based on a two-step GMM estimation. p-values for the asymptotic χ2
distribution are reported.
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Table 3: Estimation Results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1980-1990 1980-1990 1990-2002 1990-2002 1990-2002
ys,c,t−1 0.379*** 0.378*** 0.450*** 0.451*** 0.480***
(0.054) (0.054) (0.059) (0.059) (0.055)
DEFc,t · FinDeps -0.094 -0.097 -0.225** -0.213* -0.303**
(0.069) (0.070) (0.113) (0.113) (0.140)
DEFc,t−1 · FinDeps 0.102* 0.100* 0.086 0.077 0.163
(0.061) (0.061) (0.115) (0.116) (0.148)
DEFc,t−2 · FinDeps -0.127* -0.120* 0.099 0.097 0.116
(0.072) (0.072) (0.097) (0.097) (0.109)
DEFc,t · Liqs -0.096* -0.076 -0.050 -0.122 -0.091
(0.051) (0.067) (0.085) (0.112) (0.123)
DEFc,t−1 · Liqs 0.002 0.015 -0.020 0.037 0.056
(0.049) (0.067) (0.085) (0.097) (0.106)
DEFc,t−2 · Liqs -0.085 -0.131* -0.002 0.007 0.015
(0.055) (0.078) (0.077) (0.104) (0.106)
DEFc,t · Tangs 0.030 -0.112 -0.033
(0.064) (0.114) (0.141)
DEFc,t−1 · Tangs 0.019 0.087 0.059
(0.063) (0.101) (0.114)
DEFc,t−2 · Tangs -0.068 0.013 -0.011
(0.071) (0.097) (0.102)
DEFc,t · ExpOrs,c -0.051
(0.155)
DEFc,t−1 · ExpOrs,c -0.019
(0.143)
DEFc,t−1 · ExpOrs,c -0.081
(0.117)
1st autocorr. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
2nd autocorr. 0.00 0.00 0.52 0.53 0.26
Sargan test 0.00 0.00 0.23 0.22 0.13
Obs. 15406 15406 15605 15605 12828
∗∗∗,∗∗ ,∗ represent significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. The table reports
the one-step first-differenced GMM estimator for the main specifications for the 1980-
1990 and the 1990-2002 samples. The set of instruments includes the first lag of the
lagged dependent variable. Country-time effects are removed by country-time differenc-
ing prior to estimation. Sector-country fixed effects are removed by first differencing.
Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are reported within parenthesis. 1st auto-
corr. and 2nd autocorr. are autocorrelation tests on the estimation residuals. p-values
for the asymptotic N(0, 1) distribution are reported. The Sargan test of over-identifying
restrictions is based on a two-step GMM estimation. p-values for the asymptotic χ2
distribution are reported.
